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HENRY MANNE: SCHOLAR,
ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEUR,
AND FRIEND
HaroldDemsetzt
The task formally set for me is to comment on Professor Carney' s discussion of Manne's work on corporate control, and I turn to
this task first. I have also been told that, if I desire, I may write about
other matters, and the temptation to do so is irresistible. Thus, after
completing my formal assignment, I discuss the Henry Manne I
know.
Professor Carney's discussion of Manne's articles on corporate
control is competent, insightful, and correct in its description of
Manne's work on this topic. 1 Few scholars can lay claim to a discovery of the workings of unsuspected economic forces. Even fewer
have the words by which they identify their discovery become an indelible part of the language of a field of investigation. Manne's Marketfor CorporateControl is such a discovery.
I do have one complaint about Professor Carney's discussion of
this work. In the draft article, he claims a bit too much for Manne in
saying that in these articles Manne "had essentially outlined most of
the concepts that we now think of as constituting the theory of the
,,2
firm ....
I think Manne can go home happy even if I cannot accept
the full scope of this claim. Were I to accede to this claim, I would be
compelled to accept what it implies, that a large part of my work is
simply redundant. It is easy to see why Carney's focus, which is on
the issue of the separation between ownership and control, might lead
to such a claim. The truth is, there is much more to the theory of the
firm. Armen Alchian assures me that I write about this as at least half
an authority. Ken Lehn gives me the same assurance. And two
halves make a complete authority. There are problems in the theory
of the firm that have little to do with issue of separation between
ownership and control, and there are other lines of attack on this is-
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1 William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Marketfor CorporateControl" and the Origins
of the Theory of the Finn, 50 CASEW. Rs. L. REv. 215 (1999).
2 Id. at 225.
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sue. Among such problems are vertical integration, franchising,
pricing practices, contractual arrangements with suppliers, product
mix, compensation methods, capital structure, and ownership structure to name only a few.
Manne's work on the market for corporate control is as much, or
in my opinion more, a contribution to our understanding of market
competition than to our understanding of the firm. It describes an
important variant of competition that had gone unrecognized-the
market for control-and it enlightens us about the consequences of
competition in this market. This competition constrains the behavior
of corporate management and helps us understand how the quality of
business management is maintained. But competition, even of this
sort, is first and foremost a phenomenon of the market competition,
not a phenomenon of the firm.
The premise underlying Manne's argument is that the transfer of
assets in an acquisition or takeover yields an improvement in the
management of the acquired assets. But why are we so confident that
this is so? Some theories of mergers and takeovers suggest that improvement is not to be expected. Jensen's free cash flow theory, for
example, gives reasons for thinking that some acquisitions are undertaken by an entrenched management whose objective is to keep control of the corporation's wealth instead of paying it out to shareholders as dividends. In this view, the acquirer's firm is subject to a
"separation between ownership and control," and this suggests that
there will not be a significant increase in the productivity of acquired
assets.
Studies of mergers, moreover, do not offer convincing evidence
that such benefits are the dominant result of acquisitions. True, they
show that target company shareholders secure a premium for their
shares in the event of a hostile takeover, but the reason for this premium is unclear. It may be that it is paid in anticipation of a forthcoming improvement in the management of the acquired assets, an
explanation that is consistent with Manne's view. However, the premium may also result from the willingness of the entrenched management of the acquiring company, in its haste to put the firm's
wealth beyond the reach of its shareholders, to over-pay for the target's shares. Statistics show that investors think poorly of an acquisition in some instances, resulting in the reduction in the price of the
acquiring company's shares when the acquisition is announced and
completed. In other instances, they think well of an acquisition. The
' See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323-29 (1986).
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two reactions largely cancel each other out statistically, so that acquiring company share prices, on average, for large samples of acquisitions, do not change much in the event of an acquisition.
This may reflect competitiveness in the market for control, the
result of which is to keep the rate of return earned from acquisitions at
levels no larger than can be earned elsewhere. Still, the near-zero
average gain may obscure a systematic difference between acquirers.
Positive, or larger, returns to acquiring company shareholders may
reflect the presence of acquiring company management that heed
shareholder interests. Negative, or smaller, returns to acquiring company shareholders may reflect the presence of entrenched management serving their own interests. Introducing a variable correlated
with the degree to which we expect management to serve their shareholders would reveal this systematic difference. Ownership concentration is such a variable. An ownership structure that is highly concentrated facilitates easy monitoring and discipline of management by
a corporation's owners. On this plausible presumption, ownership
concentration should correlate positively with acquisition profitability.
There is some evidence that tightly held firms do earn a positive
return for their shareholders when competing in the market for control, but even this evidence does not compellingly deal with the
problem I have described. The issue here is not really the degree to
which acquiring company shareholders are made better off, which is
what such a correlation would attest to. An improvement in the management of the acquired assets is not the only way acquiring company
shareholders can be made better off. They can be made better off because the management of their firm succeeds in securing assets for a
price that makes them a good buy even if there is no subsequent improvement in the productivity of the acquired assets. A well-run acquirer, which I shall presume is one for which ownership is concentrated, probably gets assets at lower prices than does a poorly-run acquirer, but the appropriate test is to determine if more concentration
in the ownership structure of the acquiring firm is correlated positively with improvements in the productivity of the assets it acquires
through mergers and takeovers. This is not easy to ascertain, but the
successful pursuit of this objective would provide us with better material on which to base our understanding of the market for control.
Now, to the Henry Manne I know. I am not sure precisely where
and when Henry and I first met, but I think it was in the first half of
the decade of the 1960s. It is hard to believe that almost forty years
have passed since we met. Manne is a distinguished member of a rare
breed, one part successful academic entrepreneur and a second part
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scholarly talent. His entrepreneurial successes include, importantly,
innovating a new type of law school curriculum and creating the Law
& Economics Center. It is the Center with which I am most familiar.
Armen Alchian and I were the first regular lecturers of the Center, beginning our work at the University of Rochester sometime
during the decade of the 1960s. I continued this work for about ten
years. Armen stayed much longer, but he put a higher value than I
did on free golf at good courses. Teaching in the Center was a superb
experience-new friends, new problems, and new ways to think about
these problems. And the teaching generated new income, too. My
family is grateful for this. Henry Manne showed considerable skill in
setting my compensation. It was too low for me to escape from a debt
I had incurred speculating on Treasury bond prices and just high
enough to cover many months of margin calls. Working for Henry
became hardly-voluntary servitude.
The Center's pay did not come easily. The dormitory room in
which Manne imprisoned me at Rochester was in proportion to the
compensation package he had designed: just big enough to contain
me but too small to allow straying from the desk. Lectures were
given in the morning and the afternoon. Lunch and dinner were to be
used to extend these lectures in a conversation mode. The extension
was not easy. Law professors and judges have plenty to say on their
own, some of it correct. Agitation from what I was hearing, combined with frustration in not being able to get a word in, brought repeated attacks of indigestion. Now, in preparation for a meal with
judges and/or law professors, I put a roll of Tums in my pocket.
Manne shepherded the Center for almost four decades. He
guided it with great skill through three relocations, staying just beyond the reach of the posses sent by the establishment to arrest his
efforts. The importance of the Center is not easily exaggerated. It
became the premier institution by which the logic of economics met
the problems of law. Teaching in it has been an honor.
The Center yielded results much grander than I had thought possible. Judicial outcomes and the study of the law have been changed,
probably forever. Preponderantly, improvement has resulted. Occasionally, a former student renders a decision that suggests the need for
a refresher course, but perfection is not of this world. The Center's
success is easy enough to see now, but only Manne had the foresight,
the willingness to commit the time and energy, and the courage to
bear the attendant professional risks.
I retired from the Center before Manne became Dean at George
Mason, but I did visit the Law School on a few occasions. I was
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struck by the initial building that housed the School-a former department store. He had come full circle, back to a glorified ex-dry
goods store after leaving his father's Memphis dry goods store.
Henry's store, of course, was bigger than his father's, and it had an
escalator. But his father sold his business, a feat that Manne failed to
replicate despite many attempts. The State always managed to intercede just before the cash changed hands. True enough, he and his
father sold different goods. Henry sold ideas, not dry goods, and
some of these ideas were just the opposite of dry. His father offered
customers a money back guarantee. The best Henry could do was to
mount a suggestion box in the main lobby of his department store.
Henry Manne had become Dean of a school that had no tradition in
legal education and that was housed in a building having no academic
or other architectural feature worthy of the name. Yet, he made the
world of legal education stand up and take note of the very useful and
imaginative curriculum he set in place.
Beyond these considerable accomplishments, Henry Manne possesses a joy of life and a spirit of adventure that has enriched those
who have traveled with him. He pressured me to eat raw poisonous
blow fish in Japan. When I asked him how do we know if the poison
bladder has been successfully removed, he answered that, if not, we
had a good case. We motored to Monte Carlo, and he got me to lose
a few bucks in the cheap outer-lobby gambling hall. While investigating the Everglades, he kept me looking up at a strange bird whose
feeding habits he was explaining to me, and I almost stepped on a
large alligator. Despite all this, and more, we still live. Our pockets
brim with retirement money. The world can use a few more changes.
So, Henry, my good friend, what's next?

